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ABSTRACT. We propose two-sources randomness extractors over finite fields and on elliptic curves
that can extract from two sources of information without consideration of other assumptions that the
starting algorithmic assumptions with a competitive level of security. These functions have several
applications. We propose here a description of a version of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
and key extraction.
RÉSUMÉ. Nous proposons des extracteurs d’aléas 2-sources sur les corps finis et sur les courbes
elliptiques capables d’extraire à partir de plusieurs sources d’informations sans considération d’autres
hypothèses que les hypothèses algorithmiques de départ avec un niveau de sécurité compétitif. Ces
fonctions possèdent plusieurs applications. Nous proposons ici une version du protocole d’échange
de clé Diffie-Hellman incluant la phase d’extraction.
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1. Introduction
The shared element after a Diffie-Hellman exchange is gab ∈ G, where G is a cyclic
subgroup of a finite field. gab is indistinguishable from any other element of G under
the decisionnal Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption [4]. This hypothesis argues that, given
two distribution (ga, gb, gab) and (ga, gb, gc) there is no efficient algorithm that can dis-
tinguish them. However, the encryption key should be indistinguishable from a random
bit string having a uniform distribution. So we could not directly use gab as an encryption
key. It is therefore of adequate arrangements to ensure the indistinguishability of the key
such as hash functions, pseudo-random functions or random extractors.
Deterministic random extractor have been introduced in complexity theory by Tre-
visan and Vadhan [21]. Most of the work on deterministic extractors using exponential
sums for their security proof work with simple exponential sums [5, 11, 12, 13, 15]. Here,
we introduce deterministic random extractors that extract a perfectly random bit string of
an element derived from the combination of two separate sources.
More precisely, We propose a deterministic random extractor under the DDH asump-
tion, which maps two multiplicative subgroups of a finite field Fpn to the set {0, 1}k,
permitting to extract the k-least significant bits of a random element in the product of the
two subgroups. We use the double exponential sums to bound the collision probability and
give a security proof of our extractor. The same work is performed over two subgroups
G1 and G2 of points of an elliptic curve defined over a finite field Fpn .
This work is organized as follows: In section 2, We introduce some definitions and
results on both the measurement parameters of randomness and exponential sums. Section
3 gives summary of previous work. In section 4 we present and analyze the security of our
randomness extractors. In section 5, we give an application of our results, that is a version
of Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. Section 6 is our conclusion.
2. Preliminaries
This section recalls some definitions and results on the measurement of randomness
and the sums of characters. We rely on them to establish the safety of our results. [19].
2.1. Measures of randomness
Definition 2.1 Collision probability.
Let X be a finite set and X an X -valued random variable. The collision probability of
X , denoted by Col(X), is the probability Col(X) = Pr[X = X ′] =
∑
x∈X
Pr[X = x]2.
Definition 2.2 Statistical distance.
Let X be a finite set. If X and Y are X -valued random variables, then the statistical
distance SD(X,Y ) between X and Y is defined as
SD(X,Y ) =
1
2
∑
x∈X
|Pr[X = x]− Pr[Y = x]|
.
LetUX be a random variable uniformly distributed onX and δ ≤ 1 a positive real number.
Then a random variable X on X is said to be δ − uniform if SD(X,UX ) ≤ δ.
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Lemma 2.1 Relation between SD and Col(X).
Let X be a random variable over a finite set X of size |X | and ∆ = SD(X,UX ) be
the statistical distance between X and UX , where UX is a uniformly distributed random
variable over X . Then,
Col(X) ≥ 1 + 4∆
2
|X |
To establish this result, we use the following one:
Lemma 2.2 Let X be a finite set and (αx)x∈X a sequence of real numbers. Then
(
∑
x∈X |αx|)2
|X |
≤
∑
x∈X
α2x [1]
This inequality is a direct consequence of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality below:
∑
x∈X
|αx| =
∑
x∈X
|αx|.1 ≤
√∑
x∈X
α2x.
√∑
x∈X
12 ≤
√
|X |.
√∑
x∈X
α2x. [2]
Hence the result. If X is a random variable with values in X , laying αx = Pr[X = x],
since the sum of the probabilities is equal to 1 and as Col(X) =
∑
x∈X Pr[X = x]
2 we
get:
1
|X |
≤ Col(X). [3]
Now we can establish the proof of Lemma 2.1. If ∆ = 0, then the result is immediate.
Assuming ∆ 6= 0. Let us define qx = |Pr[X = x] − 1|X | |/2∆, then
∑
x qx = 1.
According to Equation 1, we get:
1
|X |
≤
∑
x∈X
q2x =
1
4∆2
∑
x∈X
(
Pr[X = x]− 1
|X |
)2
=
1
4∆2
(∑
x∈X
Pr[X = x]2 − 1
|X |
)
≤ 1
4∆2
(
col(X)− 1
|X |
)
Hence the expected result.
Definition 2.3 Deterministic (Y, δ)-extractor.
Let X and Y be two finite sets. Let Ext be a function Ext : X → Y . We say that
Ext is a deterministic (Y, δ)-extractor for X if Ext(UX ) is δ-uniform on Y . That is
SD(Ext(UX ), UY) ≤ δ.
Definition 2.4 Two-sources extractor.
Let X , Y and Z be finite sets. The function F : X × Y → Z is a two-sources
extractor if the distribution F (X,Y ) is δ-close to the uniform distribution UZ ∈ Z for
every uniformly distributed random variables X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y .
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2.2. Exponential sums
In this section, we introduce some definitions and results on exponential sums over
finite fields and over elliptic curves (see [1, 18, 22]).
2.2.1. Exponential sums over finite fields
Definition 2.5 Character.
Let G be an abelian group. A character of G is a homomorphism from G → C∗. A
character is trivial if it is identically 1. We denote the trivial character by X0 or ψ0.
Definition 2.6 Let Fq be a given finite field. An additive character ψ : F+q → C is a
character ψ with Fq considered as an additive group. A multiplicative character X :
F ∗q → C is a character with F ∗q = Fq − {0} considered as a multiplicative group. We
extend X to Fq by defining X (0) = 1 if X is trivial, and X (0) = 0 otherwise. Note that
the extended X still preserves multiplication.
The main interests of exponential sums is that they allows to construct some charac-
teristic functions and in some cases we know good bounds for them. The use of these
characteristic functions can permit to evaluate the size of these sets. We focus on certain
character sums, those involving the character ep define as it follows.
Theorem 2.1 Multiplicative characters of Fp.
The multiplicative characters of Fp, where p is a prime, are given by: ∀x ∈ Fp,
ep(x) = e
2iπx
p ∈ C∗.
Theorem 2.2 Additive characters of Fq .
Suppose q = pr where p is prime. The additive characters of Fq are given by
ψ(x) = ep(Tr(x)) where Tr(x) = x+ xp + ...+ xp
n−1
is the trace of x.
Definition 2.7 Single character sums.
Let p be a prime number, G a multiplicative subgroup of F ∗p . For all a ∈ Fp∗ , let
introduce the following notation: S(a,G) =
∑
x∈G
ep(ax).
Lemma 2.3 Let p be a prime number, G a multiplicative subgroup of F ∗p .
1) if a = 0,
∑p−1
x=0 ep(ax) = p
2) For all a ∈ F ∗p ,
∑p−1
x=0 ep(ax) = 0
3) For all x0 ∈ G and all a ∈ F ∗p , S(ax0, G) = S(a,G)
See [24] pp 69
Theorem 2.3 Polya-Vinogradov bound.
Let p be a prime number, G a multiplicative subgroup of F ∗p . For all a ∈ F ∗p :∣∣∣∣∣∑
x∈G
ep(ax)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ √p
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See [24] pp 70
Theorem 2.4 Winterhof bound.
Let V be an additive subgroup of Fpn and let ψ be an additive caracter of Fpn . Then,
∑
a∈Fpn
∣∣∣∣∣∑
x∈V
ψ(ax)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ pn
See [23]
Definition 2.8 Bilinear character sums.
Let p be a prime number, G and H be two multiplicative subgroups of F ∗p . For all
a ∈ Fp∗ , let introduce the following notation: S(a, (G,H)) =
∑
x∈G
∑
y∈H
ep(axy)
Lemma 2.4 Let p be prime and, G and H two subsets of F ∗p . Then
max
(n,p)=1
|
∑
x∈G
∑
y∈H
(ep(nxy))| ≤ (p|G||H|)
1
2
.
See [6] (bound (1.4)), [22] pp 142.
Lemma 2.5 For any subsets G, H of F ∗pn and for any complex coefficients αx, βy with
|αx| ≤ 1, |βy| ≤ 1, the following bound holds, |
∑
x∈G
∑
y∈H
αxβyψ(xy)| ≤ (pn|G||H|)
1
2 .
See [22] pp 142.
2.2.2. Exponential sums over points of elliptic curves
Definition 2.9 Elliptic curves.
Let E be an elliptic curve over Fp with p ≥ 3 defined by an affine Weieirstrass equation
of the form y2 = x3 + ax + b with coefficients a, b ∈ Fp. It is known that the set E(Fp)
of Fp-rational points of E , with the point at infinity O as the neutral element, forms an
abelian group. The group law operation is denoted by ⊕. Every point P 6= O ∈ E(Fp) is
denote by P = (x(P), y(P)). Given an integer n and a point P ∈ E(Fp), we write nP for
the sum of n copies of P:
nP = P⊕ P⊕⊕P.
Definition 2.10 Bilinear sums over additive character.
Given two subsets P,Q of E(Fp), and arbitrary complex functions σ, v supported on
P and Q we consider the bilinear sums of additive characters.
Vσ,v(ψ,P,Q) =
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
σ(P)v(Q)ψ(x(P⊕Q)).
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Lemma 2.6 Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq where q = pn, with n ≥ 1 and
let
∑
P∈P
|σ(P)|2 ≤ R and
∑
Q∈Q
|v(Q)|2 ≤ T. Then, uniformly over all nontrivial additive
character ψ of Fq , |Vσ,v(ψ,P,Q)| 
√
qRT
Let X be the set of group characters on E(Fq). We collect the points P and Q with
a given sum S = P ⊕ Q and identify this condition via the character sum over X . This
gives
Vσ,v(ψ,P,Q) =
∑
S∈E(Fq)
ψ(x(S))
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
σ(P)v(Q)
1
#E(Fq)
∑
X∈X
X(P⊕Q	 S).
Therefore
Vσ,v(ψ,P,Q) =
1
#E(Fq)
∑
X∈X
∑
S∈E(Fq)
ψ(x(S))X(S)
∑
P∈P
σ(P)X(P)
∑
Q∈Q
v(Q)X(Q).
The sum over S is O(q1/2), so
Vσ,v(ψ,P,Q)| 
q1/2
#E(Fq)
∑
X∈X
∣∣∣∣∣∑
P∈P
σ(P)X(P)
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
Q∈Q
v(Q)X(Q)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
Then, with the Cauchy inequality we get∑
X∈X
∣∣∣∣∣∑
P∈P
σ(P)X(P)
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
Q∈Q
v(Q)X(Q)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2 ≤ ∑
X∈X
∣∣∣∣∣∑
P∈P
σ(P)X(P)
∣∣∣∣∣
2 ∑
X∈X
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
Q∈Q
v(Q)X(Q)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ #E(Fq)2RT, since
∑
X∈X
∣∣∣∣∣∑
P∈P
σ(P)X(P)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∑
P1,P2∈P
σ(P1)σ(P2)
∑
X∈X
X(P1	P2) = #E(Fq)
∑
P∈P
|σ(P)|2 ≤ #E(Fq)R.
Similarly ∑
X∈X
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
Q∈Q
v(Q)X(Q)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ #E(Fq)T,
and the desired result follows.
3. Summary of previous work
After a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, the honest parties share an element
which is indistinguishable from a uniformly distributed element assuming the DDH as-
sumption. However they need a uniformly distributed bits string to perform cryptographic
operations as encryption. Thus one needs to extract entropy from the shared element.
Several solutions exist and can be implemented. There are essentially two methods of
esolution: the descent method and the character method.
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3.1. Descent method and probabilistic solutions
The descent method is based on the random oracle model. The first way, and also the
most commonly used, to derive a bits string from a random element is to hash using hash
functions. The advantage of this solution is that its implementation is simple. However,
most often the solutions of this method are probabilistic. Indeed, in addition to the original
source, it is considered an additional input which is uniformly distributed, meaning that it
is viewed as a perfect random that, in practice, is difficult to achieve. The additional input
is called "seed" and such constructions are named "seeded extractor".
For such extractors with seed of length O(log n) bits, together with enumeration over
all possible seed values, it is possible to simulate probabilistic algorithm with polynomial
overhead, using only a high min-entropy source. On that point of view, the polynomial
overhead can be too expensive. More, cryptographic applications prohibit such enumera-
tion.
In 1998, Boneh et al. [5] showed that calculating the k-most significant bits of a secret
is as difficult as calculating the common secret. The authors relied on the Hidden Number
Problem (HNP). The goal of the HNP is to find a hidden number s ∈ Z∗p , when given p
a prime, g a generator of Z∗p and access to an oracle that on query a returns the k most
significant bits of s.ga(p).
Hästad et al. [16] proposed random extractor based on the probabilistic Leftover Hash
Lemma, capable of removing all of the entropy random source having sufficient min-
entropy. This technique and its variants, however, require the use of hash functions and
perfect random.
The drawback of these extractors is that they belong to the random oracle model so
the indistinguishability cannot be proven under the DDH assumption unless you add a
random oracle which in practice is considered to be limitations.
3.2. Character method
The character method is based on the standard model. Another approach, not re-
quiring the consideration of an additional perfect random is to use the deterministic ran-
domness extractors. They are also called "seedless extractors" and do not require any
computation. The only constraint is to consider quite large subgroups.
There have been many works constructing such seedless extractors using different
techniques.
In 2008, Fouque et al. [15] proposed a simple extractor capable of extracting the k-
least significant bits or the k-most significant bits of a strong random element issued to the
Diffie-Hellman exchange on a sufficient big subgroup of Zp. They relied on exponential
sums to bound the statistical distance between two variables.
In 2009, Chevalier et al. [11] also used exponential sums but bound the collision prob-
ability of bits extracted to prove the security of their extractor. Authors used the Vino-
gradov inequality to limit the incomplete character sums. They improved the results of
Fouque by providing an extractor capable of extracting up to two times more bits. They
also featured extractor on the group of points of an elliptic curve defined over a finite field.
However, their work was limited to the finite prime fields.
In 2011, Ciss et al. [12] extended the work of Chevalier over finite non-prime fields
Fpn and elliptic curves over Fpn and more particularly on binary finite fields. They used
the Winterhof inequality to limit the incomplete character sums.
All those previous works are based on the use of single character sums for their proof.
Sometimes a source cannot be able to allow deterministic extraction. So, when seedless
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extractor from one source is impossible or when the unique source does not have enough
min-entropy, it is natural to consider doing so from several independent sources.
Indeed, in the last few years, there where results on constructing extractors for a few
independent sources. For example, in 2005, Bourgain [8] showed how to get an extractor
for 2 sources relying on bounds coming from arithmetic combinatorics. In 2012, Kasher
et al. [17] proposed a two-sources extractors in the quantum world, especially against
entanglement.
4. Our Contribution
4.1. Randomness extractors in finite fields
We propose and prove the security of a simple deterministic randomness extractor for
two subgroups G1 and G2 of F ∗q where q = p
n, with p prime and n ≥ 1. The main
theorem of this section states that the k-least significant bits of x1 · x2, where (x1, x2)
is a random element in (G1, G2), are close to a truly random element in {0, 1}k. Our
approach is from the model based on character sums.
4.1.1. Randomness extraction in Fp
Let Fp be a finite prime field such that |p| = m. Let G1 and G2 be two multiplicative
subgroups of F ∗p of order q1 and q2 respectively, with |q1| = l1, |q2| = l2, the bit-length
of q1 and q2 respectively. Let UG1 (resp. UG2 ) be a random variable uniformly distributed
on G1 (resp.G2), and k a positive integer less than m.
Definition 4.1 Extractor fk on Fp.
The extractor fk is defined as the function
fk : G1 ×G2 −→ {0, 1}k, (x1, x2) 7−→ lsbk(x1.x2)
The following theorem shows that fk is a good randomness extractor.
Theorem 4.1 Let Uk be a random variable uniformly distributed on {0, 1}k.
If ∆ = SD(fk(UG1 , UG2), Uk) then,
2∆ ≤ 2
k+m+log2(m)−(l1+l2)
2
We introduce the following notation S(a, (G1, G2)) =
∑
x1∈G1
∑
x2∈G2 ep(ax1x2).
Let us define K = 2k, and u0 = msbm−k(p − 1). Let us construct the characteristic
function, 1((x1, x2), (x′1, x
′
2), u) =
1
p
p−1∑
a=0
ep(a(x1x2−x′1x′2−Ku)) using properties (1)
and (2) of Lemma 2.3. Its equal to 1 if x1x2−x′1x′2 = Ku(p) and 0 otherwise. Therefore,
we can evaluate Col(fk(UG1 , UG2)) where UG1 (resp. UG2 ) is uniformly distributed in
G1 (resp. in G2):
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Col(fk(UG1 , UG2)) =
1
(q1q2)2
|{((x1, x2), (x′1, x′2)) ∈ (G1, G2)2∃u ≤ u0, x1x2 −
x′1x
′
2 = Ku(p)}| =
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
(x1,x2)∈(G1,G2)
∑
(x′1,x
′
2)∈(G1,G2)
u0∑
u=0
p−1∑
a=0
ep(a(x1x2−x′1x′2−
Ku)).
Then, we manipulate the sums, separate some terms (a = 0) with the rest. That is, for
a = 0,
Col(fk(UG1 , UG2)) =
1
(q1q2)2p
p−1∑
a=0
∑
(x1,x2)∈(G1,G2)
∑
(x′1,x
′
2)∈(G1,G2)
u0∑
u=0
ep(0) =
u0 + 1
p
[4]
For a ∈ F ∗p ,
Col(fk(UG1 , UG2)) =
1
(q1q2)2p
p−1∑
a=1
∑
(x1,x2)∈(G1,G2)
∑
(x′1,x
′
2)∈(G1,G2)
u0∑
u=0
ep(a(x1x2 −
x′1x
′
2 −Ku))
=
1
(q1q2)2p
p−1∑
a=1
∑
(x1,x2)∈(G1,G2)
ep(ax1x2)
∑
(x′1x
′
2)∈(G1,G2)
ep(−ax′1x′2)
u0∑
u=0
ep(−aKu)
=
1
(q1q2)2p
p−1∑
a=1
S(a, (G1, G2))S(−a, (G1, G2))
u0∑
u=0
ep(−aKu)
=
1
(q1q2)2p
p−1∑
a=1
|S(a, (G1, G2))|2
u0∑
u=0
ep(−aKu).
We inject the result of equation (4) in the above result, the collision probability is there
equal to:
Col(fk(UG1 , UG2)) =
u0 + 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
p−1∑
a=1
|S(a, (G1, G2))|2
u0∑
u=0
ep(−aKu)
According to the change of variable (a′ = Ka = 2ka(p), with gcd(2, p) = 1) and the
fact that [0, u0] is an interval, giving a geometric sum on it, We have:
p−1∑
a=1
u0∑
u=0
ep(−aKu) =
p−1∑
a=1
u0∑
u=0
ep(−au) =
p−1∑
a=1
1− ep(−a(u0 + 1))
1− ep(−a)
=
p−1∑
a=1
sin(πa(uo+1)p )
sin(πap )
= 2
p−1
2∑
a=1
sin(πa(uo+1)p )
sin(πap )
≤
2
p−1
2∑
a=1
1
sin(πap )
≤ 2
p−1
2∑
a=1
|p
a
| ≤ p log2(p)
Therefore Col(fk(UG1 , UG2)) ≤
u0 + 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
|S(a, (G1, G2))|2p log2(p) ≤
u0 + 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
(pq1q2p log2(p)) ≤
u0 + 1
p
+
p log2(p)
q1q2
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Using Lemma 2.1 which gives a relation between the statistical distance ∆, of fk(UG1 , UG2)
with the uniform distribution, and the collision probability:Col(fk(UG1 , UG2)) =
1+4∆2
2k
, the previous upper bound combined with some manipulations gives:
2∆ ≤
√
2k.Col(fk(UG1 , UG2))− 1 ≤
√
2k
p
+
√
2kp(log2(p))
q1q2
≤ 2
k+m+log2(m)−(l1+l2)
2
4.1.2. Randomness extraction in Fpn
Consider the finite field Fpn , where p is a m-bits prime and n is a positive integer
greater than 1. Fpn is a n-dimensional vector space over Fp. Let {α1, α2, , αn} be a basis
of Fpn over Fp. That means, every element x in Fpn can be represented in the form
x = x1α1 + x2α2 + . . . + xnαn, where xi ∈ Fp. Let G1 and G2 be two multiplicative
subgroups of F ∗pn of order q1 and q2 respectively, with |q1| = l1, |q2| = l2.
Let UG1 (resp. UG2 ) be a random variable uniformly distributed on G1 (resp.G2), and k
be a positive integer less than n.
The theorem here establishes that the k−first coefficients in Fp of a random element
of G1 ×G2 are indistinguishable from a random group element of F kp .
Definition 4.2 Extractor Fk on Fpn .
We define the function Fk : G1 ×G2 −→ F kp , (x, x′) 7−→ (x1x′1, x2x′2, , xkx′k).
The theorem below shows that Fk is a good randomness extractor.
Theorem 4.2 Let Uk be a random variable uniformly distributed on F kp . In the terms of
the above consideration, if ∆ = SD(Fk(UG1 , UG2), Uk) then,
∆ ≤ 2
km+nm−(l1+l2+2)
2 .
Let us introduce the notation
T (a, (G1, G2)) =
∑
x∈G1
∑
x′∈G2
ψ(axx′). Let (x, x′), (y, z) ∈ (G1, G2)2.
Let us define the following sets:
R = {xk+1x′k+1αk+1 + xk+2x′k+2αk+2 + xnx′nαn} , a subgroup of Fpn
C = {((x, x′), (y, z)) ∈ (G1, G2)2/∃r ∈ R, xx′ − yz = r}
|C| = 1
pn
∑
x∈G1,x′∈G2
∑
y∈G1,z∈G2
∑
r∈R
∑
a∈Fpn
ψ(a(xx′ − yz − r)).
We can evaluate the collision probability:
Col(Fk(UG1 , UG2)) =
|C|
|G1xG2|2
=
1
(q1q2)2pn
∑
(x,x′)∈(G1,G2)
∑
(y,z)∈(G1,G2)
∑
r∈R
∑
a∈Fpn
ψ(a(xx′ − yz − r))
=
1
(q1q2)2pn
∑
a∈Fpn
∑
(x,x′)∈(G1,G2)
ψ(axx′)
∑
(y,z)∈(G1,G2)
ψ(−ayz)
∑
r∈R
ψ(−ar).
Then we manipulate the sums, separate some terms (a = 0) which gives 1
pk
with the
rest. So for a ∈ Fp∗n
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Col(Fk(UG1 , UG2)) =
1
(q1q2)2pn
∑
a∈F∗
pn
∑
(x,x′)∈(G1,G2)
ψ(axx′)
∑
(y,z)∈(G1,G2)
ψ(−ayz)
∑
r∈R
ψ(−ar)
Then, for all a ∈ Fpn
Col(Fk(UG1 , UG2))
=
1
pk
+
1
(q1q2)2pn
∑
a∈F∗
pn
∑
(x,x′)∈(G1,G2)
ψ(axx′)
∑
(y,z)∈(G1,G2)
ψ(−ayz)
∑
r∈R
ψ(−ar)
=
1
pk
+
1
(q1q2)2pn
∑
a∈F∗
pn
|T (a, (G1, G2))|2
∑
r∈R
ψ(−ar)
≤ 1
pk
+
pn(q1q2)p
n
(q1q2)2pn
, by Lemma 2.5 and Theorem 2.4
≤ 1
pk
+
pn
(q1q2)
.
Therefore, using Lemma 2.1 with some manipulations, we obtain the expected result:
∆ ≤
√
pn+k−2
q1q2
≤ 2
km+nm−(l1+l2+2)
2 .
Corollary 4.1 LetG1 andG2 be two multiplicative subgroups ofF ∗2n of order q1 (resp.q2),
with |q1| = l1, |q2| = l2.
If e > 1 and k > 1 are two integers such as k ≤ (l1 + l2) − 2e − n + 2 then, Fk is a
((UG1 , UG2),
1
2e )-deterministic extractor .
Proof of corollary 4.1
If k ≤ (l1 + l2)− 2e− n+ 2,
k+n
2 ≤
l1+l2+2
2 − e
2
k+n
2 ≤ 2
l1+l2+2
2 2−e√
pn+k
4q1q2
≤ 2−e
Corollary 4.2 Let p > 2 a prime such as |p| = m.
If e > 1 and k > 1 are two integers such as k ≤ (l1+l2)−2e−mn+2m then, Fk is a
((UG1 , UG2), 2
−e)-deterministic extractor .
4.2. Randomness extraction in elliptic curves
Let p be a prime greater than 5. Let E be an elliptic curve over the finite field Fp and
let P,Q be two subgroups of E(Fp). Let denote |P| = q1 and |Q| = q2. Let UP and UQ
be two random variables uniformly distributed in P and Q respectively.
4.2.1. Randomness extractor in E(Fp)
Definition 4.3 We define the function extrack : P×Q −→ {0, 1}k, (P,Q) 7−→ lsbk(x(P)·
x(Q)).
The following theorem shows that extrack is a good randomness extractor.
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Theorem 4.3 Let Uk be the uniform distribution in {0, 1}k. Then,
∆(extrack(UP , UQ), Uk) 2
k+n+log2(n)−(l1+l2+2)
2 .
Let us define K = 2k, u0 = msbm−k(p− 1). Let us define the characteristic function
1((P,Q), (A,B), u) =
1
p
∑
ψ∈Ψ
ψ(x(P)x(Q) − x(A)x(B) − Ku) which is equal to 1 if
ψ = ψ0 and to 0, otherwise.
Let us compute the collision probability:
Col(extrack(UP , UQ)) =
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈Q
∑
ψ∈Ψ
∑
u≤u0
ψ(x(P)x(Q)−x(A)x(B)−
Ku). Then we manipulate the sums, separate some terms (ψ = ψ0) with the rest.
So for (ψ = ψ0),
Col(extrack(UP , UQ)) =
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ=ψ0
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈Q
∑
u≤u0
ψ0(0)
=
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ=ψ0
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈Q
∑
u≤u0
ep(Tr(0))
=
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ=ψ0
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈Q
∑
u≤u0
1 =
u0 + 1
p
And for (ψ 6= ψ0),
Col(extrack(UP , UQ)) =
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ 6=ψ0
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈Q
∑
u≤u0
ψ(x(P)x(Q)−x(A)x(B)−
Ku). Then for all ψ,
Col(extrack(UP , UQ)) =
u0 + 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ 6=ψ0
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈Q
∑
u≤u0
ψ(x(P)x(Q)−
x(A)x(B)−Ku)
=
u0 + 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ 6=ψ0
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
ψ(x(P)x(Q))
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈Q
ψ(−x(A)x(B))
∑
u≤u0
ψ(−Ku)
=
u0 + 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ 6=ψ0
|
∑
P∈P
∑
Q∈Q
ψ(x(P)x(Q))||
∑
A∈P
∑
B∈Q
ψ(−x(A)x(B))|
∑
u≤u0
ψ(−Ku)
=
u0 + 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ 6=ψ0
|V(ψ,P,Q)|2
∑
u≤u0
ψ(−Ku)
≤ 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
∑
ψ 6=ψ0
q1q2p
∑
u≤u0
ψ(−Ku), by Lemma 2.6
≤ 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)2p
pq1q2p log2(p), since it is shown that
∑
ψ 6=ψ0
∑
u≤u0
ψ(−Ku) ≤
p log2(p)
≤ 1
p
+
1
(q1q2)
p log2(p).
Therefore, using Lemma 2.1 with some manipulations, we obtain the expected result:
∆(extrack(UP , UQ), Uk)
√
2k−2p log2(p)
q1q2
= 2
k+n+log2(n)−(l1+l2+2)
2
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4.2.2. Randomness extractor in E(Fpn)
Definition 4.4 Let us define the functionExtrack : P×Q −→ F kp , (P,Q) 7−→ (t1, t2, , tk),
where x(P) · x(Q) = t1α1 + t2α2 + +tnαn.
The theorem below shows that Extrack is a good randomness extractor over E(Fpn).
Theorem 4.4 Let Uk be the uniform distribution in F kp . Then,
∆(Extrack(UP , UQ), Uk) 2
km+nm−(l1+l2+2)
2 .
Using Lemma 2.6 and Theorem 2.4, the sketch of the proof is the same as those of
Theorem 4.2
4.3. Specification: Abstract Data Type
Sort ArrayofBits;
Functions
initialize: → ArrayofBits;
createKey: Integer → ArrayofBits;
getKeyLength: ArrayofBits → Integer;
testParameterEntropy ArrayofBits,Integer → Boolean;
lsb-k: ArrayofBits,Integer → ArrayofBits;
Axioms
A1 initialize=[]
A2 createKey(r) = createKey(ConvertToBits(r))
A3 getKeyLength(initialize) = 0
A4 getKeyLength(createKey(r))
= # getKeyLength(createKey(ConvertToBits(r)))
A5 testParameterEntropy(initialize, k)=False
A6 testParameterEntropy(createKey(r), k)= True,
if getKeyLength(createKey(r))≥ k
A7 lsb-k(initialize, k)= Error
A8 lsb-k(createKey(r), k)
= lsb-k(createKey(ConvertToBits(r)), k)
5. Applications
The ideas behind a randomness extractors is the following one: suppose one got a ran-
dom variable X with some entropy but which is not uniform. For many areas of computer
science, typically for many cryptographic applications, it is required an uniformly random
variable for example to use as a secret key. Therefore, one needs to somehow extract the
randomness from X to get a uniformly distributed output.
Extractors for multiple sources. Sometimes, extraction from one source is impossi-
ble.
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There are some solutions in the probabilistic method namely "seeded extractors".
These are extractors that receive one source (with min-entropy at least k, for some pa-
rameter k) and an independent short input Y , called "seed", that is uniformly distributed.
Since the assumption over Y is strong, that is having perfectly random bits is difficult in
practice, an alternative is the use of two or more sources. In this setup, a more natural
setting is to consider Y with the same length and min-entropy threshold as X .
Moreover, cryptographic protocols require to work on sufficient large sub-groups. The
high level of considering multiple sources is to show that if the given l-sources with min-
entropy δn, δ > 0 are over a finite field Fq that has no large sub-fields (which holds in the
case that Fq is a prime field), then the cumulative distribution will have more min-entropy.
Generating keys for cryptographic protocols The interest of studying randomness
extractors has several cryptographic applications. Specially, it can apply for the key ex-
traction phase of a key exchange protocol, but also for identity encryption schemes.
The security of cryptographic protocols depends on the ability of honest parties to
generate uniformly distributed and private random key. More generally, honest parties
work in a non-secure environment set up by an adversary trying to steal the shared secret.
Thus multi-source extractors enable an honest party to sample a string that is (close to)
uniform, given multiple sources, the main requirement from each source being to contain
some min-entropy.
For example, if one wants to extract a 256-bits, for n = 1024, e = 80, one needs a
group of seize greater than 2756 with Chevalier’s et al. extractor [11]. With our extractor
fk define in subsection 4.1.1, considering two groups of sizes 2724 one can extracts 256-
bits. In this case, fk is an ((UG1 , UG2), 2
−80)−deterministic extractor.
Exemple: key exchange protocol and key extraction from two-sources
1) For the first session,
- Alice anb Bob choose a public elliptic curve group of points G = 〈P 〉; Extrack :
G×G 7→ {0, 1}k
- Alice and Bob perform the DH ratchet as follows:
i=1;
Alice chooses ai ∈ Z∗q , sends aiP to Bob;
Bob chooses bi ∈ Z∗q , sends biP to Alice;
Alice computes aibiP and Bob computes biaiP ;
They share and keep secret aibiP .
2) They can use a one-source randomness extractor for this session.
For the next session,
- Alice and Bob perform a new DH ratchet;
i=i+1;
Then both share a new aibiP ;
They can now use a two-source randomness extractor and perform the key extraction
phase as follows:
Key extraction: k = Extrack(aibiP, ai−1bi−1P ) = lsbk(x(aibiP ) + x(ai−1bi−1P )).
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6. Conclusion
The problem is: how to ensure the indistinguability of a key session which is a string
of bits issue to a shared element after a Diffie-Hellman exchange protocol. Even if the
commonly use solution is one of a hash function, the solutions in the standard model are
more reliable. We have constructed some two-sources deterministic randomness extrac-
tors which perform extraction of random bits string close to the uniform distribution over
more than one source of information. These extractors can be used in any finite field or
any elliptic curve based protocols. We have also proposed some applications, for example
a version of Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol with key extraction step.
As future work, we intend to generalize the proposed extractors to n-sources, find
analogous results for hyperelliptic curves and propose cryptographically secure pseudo-
random number generators based on these extractors. Most identity-based protocols cal-
culates the current key of a user from its identity view as a point of an (hyper)elliptic
curve . This is, an implementation of a platform of session keys generation using our
extractors, and of calculation of a point of a curve using new encoding functions is un-
derway. The goal here is to provide a practical tool for key generation phases of these
encryption primitive .
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